BACKGROUND
There is a tendency among some researchers in education to analyse power only from the perspective of how participants perceive it. This is legitimate insofar as it represents one important aspect of governance, but it can obfuscate the reality of having and using power, however it is perceived.
Recently, some authors (Donnelly, 2000) have described a dramatic shift in the balance of power away from the formal providers of education towards the individual consumer, although the extent to which parents and students are active participants in education, as opposed to passive recipients of it, has not been fully determined. It could be argued, for example, that although society has become more actively consumerist in economic terms, it remains doggedly passive in matters political and educational.
Certainly, ethnographic research on school governance provides a valuable insight into how different stakeholders perceive the extent of their power, particularly in relation to that of their counterparts in other institution types, but it does not address the question of how actual power is distributed. It is an important question. In Northern Ireland, for example, fair employment legislation does not apply to the appointment of teaching staff, so boards of governors have considerable power over school decision-making, and the only check on the exercise of this authority is the relative distribution of in¯uence among the parties represented on the boards.
In 1993, following some years as a head teacher, the author led an amalgamation of two secondary schools from different traditions in a community on the Irish border, in the course of which a new model for school governance (in the Republic of Ireland) was developed. The exercise was widely acknowledged to have been a success and the author subsequently acted as consultant to similar rationalisations in other areas.
From ®rst-hand experience of initial and developing reactions to these various restructurings, and from interviews with protagonists from boards at other schools and been granted access to minutes of meetings, it became apparent that different factions had different experiences of the extent to which their expectations of power had been met by their assigned voting strengths. For one political representative, the restructuring became: F F F . . a major disappointment. [As a] democratically elected representative, [he] came to feel like a spectator. [Participation on the board] became a complete waste of time.
Typically, parents and teachers expressed themselves content at the schoollevel restructuring, but became disappointed and perplexed at their lack of in¯uence at board level:
The school is good. The staff is happy enough and the principal is fair with the two staffs, but the Board is a washout. It's my fault in some ways because I pushed it. I thought we'd have an in¯uence, but we don't. I don't know why. We just lose every important vote ± early closings, the new posts, the`Vpship', all that. [Teacher] And:
By the time the chairman lets us speak, it's all over. The others have stitched it up. I don't know if he does it deliberately F F F he knows how to manipulate a meeting. I suppose that's what comes of being a politician for thirty years! We tried different tactics, but he calls the speakers in the same way every month ± when it's important anyway.
[Parent]
Even a representative of a majority (church) faction had reservations:
In terms of ful®lling the pastoral and spiritual needs of the community, I have no doubt that the school and its staff are doing their best and have been largely successful. But I would have concerns on account of our lack of in¯uence on the board, to be frank. This is not to say F F F that I am unhappy.
Clearly, there is some disparity between the expectation of power among parties to a restructuring and what transpires to be the reality of voting strength. This paper is an attempt to explain that disappointment. It is a game theoretic exposition of the concepts that underpin the distribution of power in multiperson interactions. As such, it is of course a simpli®cation of what practitioners (such as the author) know to be the reality of managing schools today. In the course of everyday headship, most decisions are made without recourse to formal voting. However, the decisions that are made in committee are often strategic ones and therefore of critical importance to the development of the school. For that reason it is important that the distribution of power in committee-like structures is properly understood. Awareness is often what separates a failing manager from a successful one.
Three different models of school governance are described below. They are loosely based on school types in Northern Ireland so that the reader has a sense of a situation in which voting con¯ict is realistic and pervasive, rather than arti®cial and occasional. However, the subsequent analysis is in no way peculiar to these models or to that setting. They merely serve to illustrate the principles involved. 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT REPRESENTATION
Irrespective of religious af®liation or constitution, schools everywhere have become more complex organisations as a result of the increased participation of stakeholders. This has manifested itself in a proliferation of committee-like structures, such as boards of governors, which mediate between society and the organisation. Representation on these committees usually re¯ects some kind of proportional factional entitlement to power and many assumptions about the relative voting strengths of factions on such committees are frequently made. Take the case of the Model C school described above. At ®rst sight, it appears that the voting power of the majority religious body is twice that of the minority religious body. Similarly, the ELB and parent factions are assumed to be 50% more``powerful'' than the teaching or majority religious bodies. These casual assumptions are dangerous on two counts. Firstly, they are simply wrong; and secondly, they support an illusion of participative democracy and empowerment that distracts from the need to bring about fundamental change. The advantage of a game theoretic approach is that it can model majority voting situations such as exist on school governing boards, so that these inherent fallacies become apparent.
BACKGROUND IN GAME THEORY

Coalitions and Factions
A board of governors can be regarded as a cooperative multiperson game, similar to a weighted majority game (Colman, 1982) , where coalitions are free to form and disintegrate as the agenda changes. A board of governors consists of``factions'' (the term is not intended to indicate any belligerence) and à`c oalition'' is de®ned as one or more of these factions voting together, by agreement or by chance.
Coalitions come in different sizes.
The term``single'' coalition is used to describe a coalition consisting of one faction only, although of course it is not strictly a partnership. A``grand'' coalition is de®ned as one that contains all factions on the board. A``winning'' coalition is one that commands a majority of members' votes. A``minimal'' coalition is one that cannot suffer any defection without losing its majority.
VOTING POWER ON SCHOOL GOVERNING BOARDS
A faction is de®ned as``pivotal'' to its coalition if it turns the coalition from a losing one into a winning one by virtue of its vote; and as``critical'' if its withdrawal causes that coalition to change from a winning one to a losing one. (For example, in the winning coalition formed by the ELB, teacher and majority religious factions, all three groups are critical, but only the majority religious faction ± the last one coalescing ± is pivotal.) A``null'' coalition is a coalition consisting of no faction and is ignored throughout this paper.
Underlying Assumptions: Sincerity, Completeness and Transitivity By their very nature, committees often have to choose one course of action from several alternatives according to a set of formal principles designed to ensure``fair'' outcomes, like majority voting (assumed in this paper). A tacit understanding underlying these principles is that voting is``sincere'' and along self-interest lines, that is, that factions always vote for the choice they prefer, and that coalitions have not been pre-arranged. This corresponds to what is known in game theory as``maximax'' strategy, where a player opts for the best of all possible outcomes, ignoring less favourable ones that are equally possible. Factions are also assumed to be aware of their own and each other's payoffs and to coalesce sequentially in full knowledge of what has gone before. Voting is therefore assumed to be by open declaration, not secret ballot.
Other axioms, like those of``completeness'' and``transitivity,'' also underpin the principles of committee voting. Completeness refers to the assumption that a preference is real and irreversible, that is factions that prefer``Choice X'' over``Choice Y'' do not also prefer``Choice Y'' over``Choice X.'' Transitivity assumes a consistent hierarchy of preferences, that is factions that prefer`C hoice X'' over``Choice Y'' and``Choice Y'' over``Choice Z,'' necessarily prefer``Choice X'' over``Choice Z.'' Two measurements of power, the Shapley value and the Shapley-Shubik index, will now be developed using the principles outlined above. These indices calculate the distribution of power among factions on committees and will be used to analyse in turn the three speci®c cases of Maintained (Model A), Controlled (Model B) and Out-of-state (Model C) boards of governors.
While only a basic level of mathematics is assumed for the derivation of the two power indices that follows, those readers with an aversion to mathematics may skip to the sections on analysis, noting only Equations (3) and (4) en passant.
The Shapley Value
The Shapley value, introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, rates each faction according to its a priori power, that is in proportion to the value added to coalitions by that faction joining it. Suppose a board of governors, B, has n factions or``players'' (groups of members) and some of them vote together to form a coalition C. Suppose an individual faction of C is denoted by f i and the size of the coalition C is s. Then
C is a subset of B, not Y (the empty set).
Clearly, f i has (s À 1) partners, selected from (n À 1) factions. Therefore, there are
ways of re-arranging the coalition partners of i. The reciprocal of this expression can be written
and is the probability of each such selection. Assuming all sizes of coalition to be equally likely, a particular size occurs with a probability of (1/n). Therefore, the probability of any particular coalition of size s containing the individual faction i, from n factions, is given by the expression
Suppose that coalition C has a``security level'' or``characteristic function'' denoted by 6fCg, de®ned as the minimum bene®t that coalition C can guarantee to its member factions (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) . The security level that the remaining factions have if f i is removed from C can then be denoted by 6fC À ig. Therefore, the contribution that f i alone makes to C is:
The Shapley value is now de®ned as the product of expressions (1) and (2), summed over s from 1 to n:
A pivotal faction can now be more carefully de®ned as follows: f i is pivotal if and only if f i is the faction that changes C i from a losing coalition to a winning one. The pivotal faction is the one that brings the coalition``past the winning post,'' therefore the order of voting (i.e., the order in which coalitions are formed) is crucially important.
The Shapley±Shubik Index
The Shapley±Shubik index is a friendlier variation of the Shapley value (Cowen & Fisher, 1998; Shapley & Shubik, 1954) . Suppose that a board of governors B has n factions, which form themselves into various coalitions C for voting purposes. Then, as before,
The Shapley±Shubik index is de®ned as follows:
The Shapley±Shubik index is normalised, since 0 SSf i 1, and 1 represents absolute power. Shapley and Shubik (1969) famously used the index in an analysis of power in the United Nations Security Council. Up to 1965, there were ®ve permanent members of the Security Council (USA, USSR, UK, France and China) and six non-permanent members. Analysis showed that the permanent members, who had (and still have) power of veto, had 98.7% of the power. In 1965, in an attempt to increase the power of non-permanent members, their number was increased to 10, but the Shapley±Shubik analysis showed that the power of the same ®ve permanent members had only decreased marginally, to 98.1%, proving that membership ratios are not true re¯ections of actual power.
Previous Use
Both the Shapley value and the Shapley±Shubik index will now be used to evaluate the relative power of each faction on each of the three types of school governing boards. Three-faction coalitions. 120
AN ANALYSIS OF POWER ON MODEL
Four-faction coalitions. 120
Five-faction or``grand'' coalitions.
A little consideration reveals the following:
None of the single coalitions is a winning one. 8 two-faction coalitions are winning ones (they all include C). 36 three-faction coalitions are winning (they all include C).
All four-and grand coalitions are winning.
Consequently, there are 284 winning coalitions out of a possible 325. The three-, four-and grand coalitions require further investigation.
Three-Faction Coalitions
There are 36 winning three-faction coalitions. If C is ®rst, the second voter is pivotal. If C is second or third (12 occasions each) then C itself is pivotal. Therefore, C is pivotal 24 times; L, P, T and D are pivotal on 3 occasions each.
VOTING POWER ON SCHOOL GOVERNING BOARDS
Four-Faction Coalitions
There are 120 four-faction coalitions (all winning). If C is ®rst in the voting (i.e., the ®rst faction to take a position), then the second faction to vote is pivotal (6 times each for L, P, T and D). If C is second, third or fourth in the voting, then C itself is pivotal. In the case of the 24 coalitions that do not include C, the last faction will always be the pivotal one. Therefore, C is pivotal 72 times; L, P, T and D are pivotal on 12 occasions each.
Grand Coalitions
In grand coalitions, the last faction to vote (i.e., to coalesce) can never be pivotal, even if it is C. Therefore these cases reduce to the four-faction coalition analysis outlined already. Table  Table 1 is a summary table of the extent to which each faction is pivotal in each of the ®ve possible coalition sizes. The two power measurements ± the Shapley value and the Shapley±Shubik index ± can now be calculated for each of the ®ve participating factions.
Summary
The Shapley Value for Each Faction
For the Shapley value, n 5 and s f1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5g. We assume that the contribution of faction f i to each coalition in which it is pivotal, namely 6fCg À 6fC À ig, is unity; and that the contribution of f i to each unsuccessful coalition is zero.
The results are summarised on Table 2 .
The Shapley±Shubik Index for Each Faction
The results are summarised on Table 3 . Four-faction or``grand'' coalitions.
None of the single coalitions is a winning one. 6 two-faction coalitions are winning ones (the ones which include C).
All three-and grand coalitions are winning. 
Two-Faction Coalitions
Three have C voting last and pivotal and the other three have C voting ®rst.
Three-Faction Coalitions
There are 24 winning three-faction coalitions. If C is ®rst to vote, the second faction becomes pivotal (twice each for L, P and T). If C is second (6 times) or third (6 times) in the voting, then C itself is pivotal. In the other 6 coalitions without C, the last one to vote becomes pivotal. Therefore, C is pivotal 12 times; L, P, T are pivotal on 4 occasions each.
Grand Coalitions
These cases reduce to the three-faction coalition analysis outlined above.
Summary Table  Table 4 is a summary table of the extent to which each faction is pivotal in each of the ®ve possible coalition sizes. The two actual power measurements for each of the ®ve participating factions can now be calculated: the Shapley value and the Shapley±Shubik index.
The Shapley Value for Each Faction
For the Shapley value, n 4 and s f1Y 2Y 3Y 4g. We assume that the contribution of f i to each coalition in which it is pivotal, namely 6fCg À 6fC À ig, is unity; and that the contribution of f i to each unsuccessful coalition is zero. The results are summarised on Table 5 .
The Shapley±Shubik Index for Each Faction
The results are summarised on Table 6 . 
AN ANALYSIS OF POWER ON MODEL C: A SAMPLE OUT-OF-STATE/INTEGRATED/GRAMMAR SCHOOL BOARD
Let the ®ve factions on the board of governors be denoted as follows: Three-faction coalitions. 120
None of the single coalitions is a winning one. Only two of the two-faction coalitions are winning ones (LP and PL).
The only three-faction coalitions that are not winning are the six variations of TrR. All four-and grand coalitions are winning. Consequently, there are 296 winning coalitions out of a possible 325.
The three-, four-and grand coalitions require further investigation.
Three-Faction Coalitions
There are 54 winning three-faction coalitions. Twelve of these ®nish with voting from L; 12 with voting from P; and 10 with voting from each of R, T and r. Of these last 30, 6 start with PL or LP. Therefore, L and P are each pivotal in 15 three-faction coalitions; and R, T and r are each pivotal in 8.
Four-Faction Coalitions
There are 120 four-faction coalitions (all winning) and in one-®fth of them, L votes ®rst. One-quarter of those 24 times, P votes next, so P will be pivotal in these 6 coalitions. R, T and r (in any order) will vote ®rst on a further 12 occasions and half that time, P will be pivotal. In all other coalitions, the pivotal position will be third in the voting, and P will be in this position on 24 occasions. In total then, P will be pivotal for 36 coalitions.
A similar analysis reveals that L is also pivotal for 36 four-faction coalitions; and R, T and r are each pivotal in 16.
Grand Coalitions
Since grand coalitions have 11 votes and the largest faction commands only 3, the last faction voting can never be pivotal. Therefore, these cases reduce to the four-faction coalition analysis outlined above. Table  Table 7 is a summary table of the extent to which each faction is pivotal in each of the ®ve possible coalition sizes. The two actual power measurements ± the Shapley value and the Shapley±Shubik index ± for each of the ®ve participating factions can now be calculated.
Summary
The Shapley Value for Each Faction
For the Shapley value, n 5 and s f1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5g. We assume that the contribution of f i to each coalition in which it is pivotal, namely 6fCgÀ 6fC À ig, is unity; and that the contribution of f i to each unsuccessful coalition is zero.
The results are summarised on Table 8 .
The Shapley±Shubik Index for Each Faction
The results are summarised on Table 9 .
SUMMARY
The Relative Power of Major and Minor Factions
Voluntary Maintained School Boards The church nominees have four seats on the board, and one each for parent, teacher and Department of Education (DENI) representatives. The Education and Library Board (ELB) has two seats. However, analysis reveals that church nominees have (more than) six times the power of any of the other factions!
Controlled Secondary School Boards
The church nominees have four seats on the board, to two each for parent and ELB representatives. There is one teacher seat. Analysis from both indices reveals that church nominees have three times the power of any of the other factions.
A Sample Out-Of-State/Integrated/Grammar School Board The Shapley value and the Shapley±Shubik index both reveal that the power of the ELB faction and the parent body is (approximately) 2.2 times that of each of the other three factions. This is a truer re¯ection of power than the ratio of memberships; 3:2 in the case of teachers and majority religious factions; 3:1 in the case of minority religious body. The distribution of power is most equal on the sample Out-of-state/ Integrated/Grammar school board and most skewed in favour of the majority on (Roman Catholic) Voluntary Maintained boards ± twice as much as the skew towards the majority in (Protestant) Controlled Secondary boards. Both churches, but particularly the church representatives on Voluntary Maintained boards, retain considerable power despite the illusion of empowerment.
The Relative Power of the Minor Factions
Voluntary Maintained School Boards
The minor factions all have equal power. The ELB does not have twice that of parents, teachers or DENI, as might be assumed. This is a re¯ection of the fact that each of the four minor factions is equally``useful'' in forming winning coalitions.
Controlled Secondary School Boards
The minor factions all have equal power on Controlled Secondary boards too ± a minor pleasant surprise for teachers, but a disappointment to parents and the ELB.
A Sample Out-Of-State/Integrated/Grammar School Board Both indices reveal that the power of the minority religious body is the same as that of the majority religious body, although ®rst impressions would suggest that the latter was twice as powerful. This may be signi®cant in a Northern Ireland context, as it may encourage cooperation while maintaining a countenance of proportionality for the participants.
The Payoff for Winning Coalitions
If the Shapley value was used to award payoffs commensurate with contribution, as suggested by``minimum resource theory'' (Gamson, 1961) , then it would be a way of achieving a market-like outcome where a market did not exist per se ± such as with school boards. However, members of school boards are not rewarded like that, if at all, and the motivational payoff for the pivotal factions can best be understood in terms of political in¯uence and control. Experience suggests that the payoff for a winning coalition is simply that its member factions are perceived to be in¯uential and share, to a greater or lesser extent, the power and control associated with winning.
The Order of Voting or Coalescence
Voluntary Maintained School Boards Table 10 reveals that minority factions on Voluntary Maintained boards are least powerful when voting third, that is when coalescing as the third party to a coalition. Voting second is slightly better than voting third (57% of the time the faction will be pivotal, compared to 43%). It does not matter so much for the four church trustees.
Voting ®rst or last (i.e., being the ®rst faction to take a position or the last to coalesce) means that the faction cannot be pivotal, so there is a commensurate loss of power in so doing. Table 11 reveals that, even for the majority faction (the church transferors), there is no great advantage to coalescing second as opposed to third (56 to 44%), but again, factions should avoid voting ®rst or last. A Sample Out-Of-State/Integrated/Grammar School Board Analysis reveals that a faction is most powerfully placed when it is the third faction to make its position known. This is particularly so for the three minor factions, as Table 12 shows. For these to be pivotal, they must coalesce third in the winning coalition. Even for the two majority factions, there is considerable advantage to voting third in the order, and second is slightly better than fourth. As always, factions should avoid voting ®rst or last.
Controlled Secondary School Boards
Minimal Winning Coalitions
Coalescing with the pivotally positioned faction is the next-best thing to being pivotal oneself. If it is assumed that there is no political reward for losing, and that all factions want to share the spoils of winning, then the strategy should always be to end up on the winning side. Unfortunately, this is opposed by an equal and opposite desire on the part of those who have already formed a winning coalition not to accept super¯uous members! Just as there is no incentive for the last voting faction to dissent, there is no incentive for the ®rst three or four factions to form grand coalitions, since the last-joining faction is never``important.'' This idea is analogous to Riker's``minimal winning coalition theory'' (1962), which states that if a coalition is large enough to win it should avoid accepting additional factions, since these new members will demand a share in the payoff. The concept of minimal winning coalitions forms the basis for a power index not used in this paper, the Deegan±Packel index, but which may be of interest to some readers (Deegan & Packel, 1978) .
Other Applications
While this discussion has concentrated on school governance, analysis of this sort can easily be applied to other competitive voting situations, both within education and without. For example, similar theory has been used to analyse voting power in the European Union. When its forerunner was set up by the Treaty of Rome in 1958, there were ®ve member states, of which Luxembourg was one. Luxembourg had 1 vote out of a total of 17, but it has subsequently been shown that no coalition of member states ever needed Luxembourg in order to achieve a majority. In effect, Luxembourg was a powerless bystander in terms of competitive voting, though no doubt it bene®ted in other ways from membership of the``grand coalition.''
Implications for Forming Committees
There are some additional practical implications for how committees are constituted, whether they are dissemination forums or statutory decisionmaking bodies.
The numerical voting strength of a faction on a committee is not a re¯ection of its real power. This can lead to frustration, but it can also be a source of stability.
Committees should be constituted so as to re¯ect accurately the desired (or entitled) proportional representation. School managers need to be aware of the possibility of disproportionate voting power, particularly when setting up structures for staff involvement in decision-making. Staff committees, which appear to re¯ect the relative sizes of different subject groupings, for example, may be dangerously skewed.
CONCLUSION
This paper considered two measurements of power; the Shapley value and the Shapley±Shubik index. There are others, such as the Johnston Index (Johnston, 1978) , which looks at the (reciprocal of the) number of critical VOTING POWER ON SCHOOL GOVERNING BOARDS factions; the Deegan±Packel index (1978) , which looks at the (reciprocal of the) number of minimal factions; and the Banzhaf index (1965) , which looks at the number of coalitions in which a faction is both critical and pivotal. None is any better suited to the circumstances of school governance than the two used in this paper, but they make interesting reading for those who wish to apply game theory to more complicated situations. All power indices are limited, in a small way, by the axioms and assumptions already noted in the text. These include the assumption that factions always vote sincerely and along rational self-interest lines; that voting is open; that coalitions have not been pre-arranged; that all coalitions are equally likely to appear; and that there is a reward for being part of a winning coalition. The appropriateness of these assumptions is, of course, a matter for judgement. Each faction judges the properties of a particular solution according to the favourableness of its outcomes, not by its innate attractiveness. Therefore, power is ultimately judged by its actual exercise, rather than its perceived distribution. Perceptions can be mistaken, as this paper has hopefully shown.
Power is the exercise of authority and in¯uence, and in schools this is largely the remit of the governing body, with the head as chief executive. The constitution of these powerful committees is sometimes taken as a re¯ection of something deeper happening in society generally, as notions about democratisation and empowerment are transferred to and from school settings. However, the perception of how power is distributed is often¯attering to deceive. The reality is often disappointing. Despite minority stakeholder representation on boards of governors and the like, the formal providers of education still retain power out of all proportion to their membership. It is for others to decide whether this is desirable or not, but it is unlikely that power has been fundamentally redistributed in recent times, as is sometimes claimed.
